NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-SCHOOLS

AND

SCHOOL DISTRICTS-THE

SUBTLE MOVE TOWARD TOTAL STATE CONTROL

-Board of Educa-

tion of Elizabeth v. City Council of Elizabeth, 55 N.J. 501, 262
A.2d 881 (1970); Board of Education of East Brunswick Twp. v.
Township Council of East Brunswick, 48 N.J. 94, 223 A.2d 481

(1966).
In March 1970 the New Jersey Supreme Court again found itself
confronted with the perplexity of specifying and delineating the powers
of various subdivisions under the New Jersey Education Law.' The
controversy, following the trend of the past decade, involved the
clarification of the interrelated broad statutory powers granted to the
various governmental entities which administer the public school system. The result of the court's decision was the intensification of the
already extensive power of the Commissioner of Education and the
correlative degeneration of the powers of local school boards, munic2
ipal governing bodies and the electorate.
1 The statutes on education are found in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:l to § 18A:76 (1968).
2 The legislature, pursuant to the mandate of art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 of the NEw
JERSEY CONSTITUTION, has enacted a series of laws pertaining to the administration of the
educational system in New Jersey. These laws are found in N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A
(Education) which became effective on January 11, 1968, replacing tit. 18 of the REvIsED
STATUTES of 1937.

The administrative hierarchy established by the legislature has at its peak two large
subdivisions, the Department of Higher Education, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-1 (1968),
and the State Department of Education, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-1 (1968). It is not
necessary to elucidate the organizational makeup of the Department of Higher Education, since this note deals only with the powers conferred upon the Department of
Education and its divisions. However, it should be noted that prior to the present
Education law, the government of the institutions of higher learning came under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Education.
The Department of Education is composed of the State Board of Education, which
is at the zenithal position in the Department's diagrammatic structure, and the Commissioner of Education. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-1 (1968). The State Board consists of
fourteen persons, two of whom, the chairman of the Board of Higher Education and
the chancellor, are members ex officio without voting authority. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-3
(1968). The members of the State Board are appointed by the governor with the consent
of the senate for six year terms without compensation. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:4-4, 6
(1968). The State Board is invested with the general supervision and control of public
education in the state, except higher education, and is given the power to make, repeal,
alter and enforce rules for its own government and for carrying out the school laws.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:4-10, 15 (1968). Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-16 (1968), it also
has "all powers ... requisite to the performance of its duties."
The Commissioner of Education is both the chief executive and administrative officer
of the Department of Education and also the official agent of the State Board for all
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In Board of Education of Elizabeth v. City Council of Elizabeth,3
the court affirmed and extended the position taken in the leading case
of Board of Education of East Brunswick Twp. v. Township Council
of East Brunswick.4 Although both cases were brought by local boards
of education and involved the sufficiency of school budgets approved
by the respective municipal governing bodies, the three major issues,
and one issue in the form of dicta, which evolved from these cases were:
(1) the power and authority of the Commissioner of Education; (2)
the standard the Commissioner is to apply in reviewing controversies
and disputes under the school laws; (3) the standard the court is to
apply in reviewing the Department of Education's decisions; and (4)
the power of the electorate in relation to the municipal governing
body, the local board of education and the Department of Education.
Petitioner, Board of Education of Elizabeth, pursuant to the supreme court's decision in the East Brunswick5 case, appealed to the
Commissioner of Education from a certification by the municipal
governing body of a school budget one million dollars less than that
requested by the petitioner for the school year commencing July 1,
1969.6 The board of education had submitted, pursuant to the statutes
governing a type I school district,7 a budget of $10,967,401.23 to the
board of school estimate, who reduced the budget to $9,539,333.23.1
purposes. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-22 (1968). The Commissioner has general supervisory
power over all schools of the state receiving state appropriations except institutions of
higher education, and has the duty of enforcing all rules prescribed by the State Board.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-23 (1968).
Concerning the area of educational quarrels, the Commissioner has original jurisdiction to hear and determine all controversies and disputes arising under the school
laws or under rules promulgated by him or the State Board. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9
(1968). Thereafter, appeal from the Commissioner's decision is taken to the State Board
of Education. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-27 (1968).
On the district level, each school district has its own board of education which is a
body corporate that conducts and supervises the schools of that district. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:10-1 (1968). The boards of education of the local districts are under the supervision
and control of the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education. The
election of the members of the local boards and the latter's powers in their respective
districts differ as to whether the district is a type I or type II district, which distinction
is discussed note 12 infra.
3 55 N.J. 501, 262 A.2d 881 (1970).
4 48 N.J. 94, 223 A.2d 481 (1966).
5 East Brunswick held that where the dispute consisted of the local board of education's contention that the reduced budget, certified by the township council, was insufficient to provide for a thorough and efficient system of public schools, the controversy
arose under the school laws, and appeal to the Commissioner and the State Board should
be exhausted before judicial review is granted.
6 55 N.J. at 504, 262 A.2d at 882.
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-7 (1968).
8 55 N.J. at 504, 262 A.2d at 882.
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Thereafter, the municipal governing body, following public hearings
and consultation with the board of education, fixed the sum at
$9,967,339.23. 9 From this determination the board of education appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who found that an additional appropriation of $866,702 was necessary "for the maintenance
and operation of a thorough and efficient system of public schools in
the City of Elizabeth for the 1969-70 school year," and so directed such
appropriation.' 0 Upon petition of both the board of education and the
governing body the supreme court allowed direct appeal to it."
East Brunswick and Elizabeth reached the supreme court on the

issues of the Commissioner of Education's authority to review and
adjudicate a budget dispute between the local board of education and
the municipal governing body, and the requisite of exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. The court in
East Brunswick affirmed the appellate division's ruling that the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over such disputes in a type II
district,' 2 and that the administrative remedies must be exhausted be9 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-17 (1968) provides:
The governing body of the municipality shall include the amount so appropriated in its tax ordinance, and the same shall be assessed, levied and collected in the same manner as other moneys appropriated are assessed, levied
and collected, but the governing body shall not be required so to appropriate
any amount in excess of 1 % of the assessed valuation of the ratables of the
municipality, but may do so if it so determines by resolution.
All budget figures involved in Elizabeth were more than twice the amount of 11,% of
assessed valuations for the year and therefore the city council had authority to reject the
budget and fix a new amount. See Gualano v. Board of Estimate, 39 N.J. 300, 188 A.2d
569 (1963); Barber v. Board of School Estimate, 71 N.J. Super. 556, 177 A.2d 600 (L. Div.
1962).
10 55 N.J. at 504-05, 262 A.2d at 882-83.
11 Id. at 505, 262 A.2d at 883.
12 The local school districts in New Jersey are classified as type I and type II districts. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:9-1, 2, 3 (1968). For present purposes, the major difference
between a type I and type II district is the procedure for adopting and certifying a school
budget.
In a type I district the board of education prepares the budget and submits it to the
board of school estimate. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-7 (1968). After public hearings, the
board of estimate fixes and determines the amount of money necessary for the use of
the public schools in the district for the ensuing school year. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-14
(1968). Thereafter, the board of school estimate's certification goes to both the local
board and the governing body of the municipality, the latter having the duty of directing
appropriation in line with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:22-15, 17 (1968).
In a type II district the school budget is also prepared by the local board of education. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-7 (1968). However, instead of being sent to an intermediary
body as in a type I district, it is submitted to the voters who accept or reject it. N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:22-32, 33 (1968). If the budget is rejected, the local board then resubmits it, in the same or altered form, within 15 days at a special election. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:22-36 (1968). If again rejected, it comes before the municipal governing
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fore judicial review could be obtained. Elizabeth reaffirmed this holding 3 and extended the Commissioner's power, giving him authority
to overrule the governing body of a type I district. The court's rationale
was that the Commissioner's responsibilities as chief agent of the State
Board of Education included the duty to enforce the New Jersey
Constitution, which mandates that "[t]he Legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools . .. "14'. and that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:22-17 and
18A:22-37 do not limit the authority of the Commissioner in exercising this duty.15
1
The powers of the State Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education under the school laws have historically been
extremely broad, both as to the authority to promulgate rules and to
determine controversies on appeal. 16 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (1968),
provides:
The commissioner shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, without cost to the parties, all controversies and disputes
arising under the school laws, excepting those governing higher
education, or under the rules of the state board or of the commissioner.

The appellate authority of the State Board of Education is likewise
broad: "Any party aggrieved by any determination of the commisbody, who after consultation with the board of education, certifies to the county board
of taxation the amount which it determines "is necessary to be appropriated, for each
item appearing in such budget, to provide a thorough and efficient system of schools in
." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-37 (Supp. 1969). It should be noted that
the district ....
some type II districts may have a board of estimate in which case the procedure differs.
This however is not necessary to discuss here.
13 55 N.J. at 505, 262 A.2d at 883. Generally speaking, the primary difference between Elizabeth and East Brunswick is that the former involved a type I district whereas
the latter involved a type II district. The major issue in each case is the extent of the
Commissioner's jurisdiction. The only other significant divergence between the cases is
that East Brunswick, since it was originally brought directly to the courts, involved a
discussion of the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies; and Elizabeth, since it
was an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner, contained the question of which
standard was to be applied by the court in reviewing the Commissioner's decision.
14 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, par. 1.
15 55 N.J. at 506, 262 A.2d at 883. The court reasoned that the legislature delegated
the administration of its duty under art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 of the NEW JERSEY CONSTITUT1ON to the State Board of Education, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:4-10 (1968), and since the
Commissioner is the official agent of the State Board for all purposes, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:4-22 (1968), it is his. duty to see to it that each district complies with the mandate
of providing a thorough and efficient school system.
18 Law of April 27, 1911, ch. 231, N.J. Laws 506-10 (1911); Law of March 21, 1867,
ch. 179, N.J. Laws 360-81 (1867).
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sioner may appeal from his determination to the state board."u1 To
the courts has fallen the duty of interpreting the specific extent of the
powers delegated, and while they have intermittently appeared to
limit these powers,' 8 the occurrence of such instances has diminished
and previous limitations are being overshadowed by the judiciary's
continuing confirmation of the legislature's grant of broad powers. 19
The two major issues which the courts have had to deal with in
determining the extent of the Commissioner's jurisdiction are the
interpretation of the phrase "all controversies and disputes arising
under the school laws," and the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A review of the various cases reveals that there is
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-27 (1968) (lines 1-2).

18 Matawan v. Monmouth Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 51 N.J. 291, 240 A.2d 8 (1968)
(court refused to dismiss action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because
case involved interpretation of a statute and constitutional question); Boult v. Board
of Educ., 136 N.J.L. 521, 57 A.2d 12 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948) (Commissioner and State
Board did not have power to overrule local board's decision to close school merely
because that decision was based on erroneous factual material); Kopera v. West Orange
Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 158 A.2d 842 (App. Div. 1960) (in reviewing an unsatisfactory rating given to a tenure teacher the only question for the Commissioner and
State Board on review is whether there is a reasonable basis for the factual conclusion);
Waldor v. Untermann, 7 N.J. Super. 605, 72 A.2d 342 (L. Div.), afJ'd, 10 N.J. Super. 188,
76 A.2d 906 (App. Div. 1950) (action seeking ouster of school board member for failure
to meet residence requirement could be brought directly to courts without exhaustion
of administrative remedies); Reilly v. Board of Educ., 127 N.J.L. 490, 23 A.2d 285 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) (matter of school janitor's pension did not come under Commissioner's jurisdiction); Koven v. Stanley, 84 N.J.L. 446, 87 A. 89 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (quo warranto proceeding to determine the title to office of members of local board was allowed without
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies).
19 Shepard v. Board of Educ., 207 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1962) (federal court dismissed school segregation suit, based on Civil Rights Act, because plaintiffs had not
exhausted state's administrative remedies); Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212
A.2d 1 (1965) (Commissioner erred in allowing local board to determine sufficiency of
school integration plan ); In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 138 A.2d 393 (1958) (Commissioner
has jurisdiction to review decision of board of examiners); Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ.,
23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957) (Commissioner may determine if hearing accorded to
teachers by local board was unfair, and if so, remand matter for further proceedings);
Rankin v. Board of Educ., 135 N.J.L. 299, 51 A.2d 194 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947) (local
board's adoption of rules governing, and contracts providing for, pupil transportation
is subject to supervision and control of State Board); Board of Educ. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 115 N.J.L. 364, 180 A. 430 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (contract dispute between teacher and
local board falls within Commissioner's jurisdiction); Schwarzrock v. Board of Educ.,
90 N.J.L. 370, 101 A. 394 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (Commissioner should hold de novo hearing
in reviewing local board's decision to remove supervisor of buildings and repairs);
Ridgway v. Upper Freehold Bd. of Educ., 88 N.J.L. 530, 96 A. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1916)
(court dismissed suit brought to compel local board to call special meeting of voters, for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Montclair v. Baxter, 76 N.J.L. 68, 68 A. 794
(Sup. Ct. 1908) (court dismissed action involving interpretation of a statute, for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies).
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no precise rule for establishing which controversies do, and which do
not, arise under the school laws. 20 The general trend is toward a
liberal interpretation of this phrase and a broadening of the Commissioner's scope of review. This is demonstrated in Laba v. Newark
Board of Education,2' which gave the local board and the State Department of Education the right to determine if a teacher has contumaciously or frivolously invoked the fifth amendment before a
congressional subcommittee, Booker v. Board of Education,2 2 which
gave the State Department of Education the right to determine the
standard and means of integrating the school system, and Board
of Education of Flemington v. State Board,2 3 which involved the interpretation of a teacher's contract and the effect of the division of
a school district upon it.
East Brunswick and Elizabeth, following the general trend, have
continued to enlarge the jurisdictional scope of the already powerful
State Department of Education. Prior to East Brunswick, school
budget disputes involving the sufficiency of the amount to be allocated were settled at the local level. 24 However, it is now clear that
the Commissioner and the State Board have the authority and power
to overrule the local officials' determination upon review.2 5
20 Typical of the statements made in determining this issue is that of the court
in Ridgway v. Upper Freehold Bd. of Educ., 88 N.J.L. 530, 531, 96 A. 390, 390-91 (Sup.
Ct. 1916):
We consider that the matter is brought before us prematurely. It is
manifestly a controversy arising under the school laws, and by the terms of
the act, cognizable in the first instance by the state superintendent of public
instruction, and on appeal from his decision, by the state board of education.
Another example is the reasoning used in In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 604, 138 A.2d 393,
400 (1958):
The statute does not in express terms direct that appeal from such decision
be taken to the Commissioner. However, N.J.S.A. 18:3-14 says that he
"shall decide without cost to the parties all controversies and disputes arising
under the school laws, or under the rules and regulations of the state board
or of the commissioner."
This enactment provides the basis for his review of the action of local boards
of education. . . . And it is reasonable to suppose that the same avenue was
meant to be followed in challenging an order of the Board of Examiners.
See also Shepard v. Board of Educ., 207 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D.N.J. 1962); Durgin v.
Brown, 37 N.J. 189, 202, 180 A.2d 136, 142 (1962); Board of Educ. v. Township Council,
91 N.J. Super. 20, 24, 218 A.2d 896, 898 (App. Div. 1966).
21 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957).
22 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).
23 81 N.J.L. 211, 81 A. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1911), aff'd sub nom. Glazer v. Flemington,
85 N.J.L. 384, 91 A. 1068 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913).
24 91 N.J. Super. 20, 22, 218 A.2d 896, 897 (App. Div. 1966) (by implication).
25 Elizabeth, 55 N.J. 501, 262 A.2d 881 (1970); East Brunswick, 48 N.J. 94, 223
A.2d 481 (1966).
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The important question, however, seems not to be the categorization of school law disputes and non-school law disputes, but rather
the means of predicting when the courts will decide to take original
jurisdiction over a particular case. During the incipience of school
related disputes, the courts were notably conscious of the administrative-judicial dichotomy, and cautious not to usurp original jurisdiction from the school authorities.2 6 This awareness led to a refusal
to take jurisdiction even over matters whose final determination
would be predicated upon a question of law.27 Later, however, the
courts became freer in assuming original jurisdiction even though the
2
controversy arose under the school laws. 1
The courts presently take original jurisdiction over various school
related disputes by virtue of N.J.R. 4:69-5 which states:
Except where it is manifest that the interest of justice requires
otherwise, actions under R. 4:69 shall not be maintainable as long
as there is available a right of review before an administrative
agency which has not been exhausted.
Under the first clause of this rule the courts have taken original jurisdiction for various reasons which have recently been outlined and
consolidated in Borough of Matawan v. Monmouth County Board of
Taxation.2 9 This case reiterated the proposition that "[o]rdinarily,
administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort is had to the
courts, but the exhaustion is neither jurisdictional nor absolute and
may be departed from where, in the opinion of the court, the interest
of justice so requires. ' 30 It was further stated that "[w]hen the issue
to be decided is solely a matter of law" or where "further use of administrative expertise will be an idle gesture" the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicableY1 The court, quoting
with approval the language used in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Kingsley,3 2 stated:

However, we are not particularly concerned with the label or
description placed on the issue but are concerned with underlying
26 See Ridgway v. Board of Educ., 88 N.J.L. 530, 96 A. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Montclair v. Baxter, 76 N.J.L. 68, 68 A. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Thompson v. Board of Educ.,
57 N.J.L. 628, 31 A. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
27 See Montclair v. Baxter, 76 N.J.L. 68, 68 A. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
28 See Gualano v. Board of Estimate, 39 N.J. 300, 188 A.2d 569 (1963); Newark
Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 34, 259 A.2d 742 (L. Div. 1969);
Barber v. Board of School Estimate, 71 N.J. Super. 556, 177 A.2d 600 (L. Div. 1962).
29 51 N.J. 291, 240 A.2d 8 (1968).
30 Id. at 296, 240 A.2d at 11.
31 Id. at 296-97, 240 A.2d at 11.
32 37 N.J. 136, 179 A2d 729 (1962).
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consideration such as the relative delay and expense, the necessity
for taking evidence and making factual determination thereon, the
nature of the agency and the extent of judgment, discretion and
expertise involved, and such other pertinent factors . . . as may

fairly serve to aid in determining whether, on balance, the interests of justice dictate the extraordinary course of bypassing
the
33
administrative remedies made available by the Legislature.
Although Matawan clarifies the position of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it still leaves the practical problem
of overcoming the judiciary's inherent reluctance to intervene in
administrative affairs. From the chronicle of school cases, the rule of
thumb which can be induced seems to be almost in the form of a
rebuttable presumption, i.e., if a set of circumstances is substantially related to school affairs, whether concerned with a legal issue,
a factual issue, an issue requiring expeditious determination, or an
issue in which administrative policy and expertise is not involved, it
arises under the State Department of Education's jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. 34 In the area of
budget disputes, recent cases show that the courts are willing to bypass
administrative review when the controversy involves interpretation of
a statute and requires expeditious determination,3 5 but the reluctance
to extend this to disputes involving fact finding or discretionary findings is seen in both East Brunswick and Elizabeth.
2
Like the expansion of controversies held to fall within the Department's jurisdiction, Elizabeth and East Brunswick have further
increased the Department's power by changing the Standard the latter
is to apply in determining the outcome of cases brought before it.
Elizabeth, in commenting upon the standard, expressed the view that:
Although the Commissioner specifically found that the governing
body's determination was not arbitrary or capricious-which we
51 N.J. at 297, 240 A.2d at 11.
The following language in East Brunswick is indicative of the courts' attitude:
While there have been instances where the courts have entertained controversies under the school laws without prior exhaustion of the available administrative remedies, those instances have been isolated and exceptional
ones ....
48 N.J. at 102, 223 A.2d at 485. See Shepard v. Board of Educ., 207 F. Supp. 341, 343-44
(D.N.J. 1962).
35 See Gualano v. Board of Estimate, 39 N.J. 300, 188 A.2d 569 (1963); Board of
Educ. v. Board of Estimate, 95 N.J. Super. 284, 230 A.2d 895 (App. Div. 1967); Barber
v. Board of School Estimate, 71 N.J. Super. 556, 177 A.2d 600 (L. Div. 1962).
33
34
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assume means in the present context that it was made in good
faith and not irresponsibly-his scope of review and obligation
goes much beyond that criterion. As East Brunswick pointed out,
he "is charged with the overriding responsibility of seeing to it
that the mandate for a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools is being carried out." 6
The transformation is illuminated when comparing the appellate
division's comments in East Brunswick on this issue-"the council's
action must be sustained unless the Commissioner finds the budget it
fixed was so deficient as to constitute a purely arbitrary exercise of dis37
cretion devoid of any reasonable foundation.
Although the controversies were held to be cognizable by the
Commissioner under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (1968), a review statute, the actual effect of the decisions was the abrogation of the Commissioner's application of the appellate standard, and the substitution
of his discretion in place of that of the municipal governing bodies.3 8
This becomes apparent when considering that the municipal governing bodies of both a type I and type II district, and the Commissioner,
have the same standard in fixing a budget, namely to establish a
budget which would provide for a thorough and efficient system of
public schools.3 9 Since such a standard can only be applied through
a person's or group's discretion, it is, in effect, the Commissioner's
discretion which is controlling.
A brief summary of the law on this issue will indicate the extent
of the metamorphosis which has taken place in approximately the last
four decades. One of the earlier cases in which the court noted the
standard to be applied in reviewing the actions of a local board was
55 N.J. at 508, 262 A.2d at 884.
91 N.J. Super. at 26, 218 A.2d at 899.
[The Commissioner in deciding the budget dispute here before him, will
be called upon to determine not only the strict issue of arbitrariness but also
whether the State's educational policies are being properly fulfilled. Thus, if
he finds that the budget fixed by the governing body is insufficient to enable
compliance with mandatory legislative and administrative educational requirements or is insufficient to meet minimum educational standards for the
mandated "thorough and efficient" East Brunswick school system, he will direct appropriate corrective action by the governing body or fix the budget on
his own within the limits originally proposed by the board of education. On
the other hand, if he finds that the governing body's budget is not so inadequate, even though significantly below what the Board of Education had
fixed or what he would fix if he were acting as the original budget-making
body under R.S. 18:7-83, then he will sustain it, absent any independent showing of procedural or substantive arbitrariness.
48 N.J. at 107, 223 A.2d at 488.
39 55 N.J. at 506, 262 A.2d at 883. Although the standard applied by both a type I
and type II district is the same, for a type I district it emanates from case law and for
a type II district it originates from a statute, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:22-37 (1968).
36
37
38
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Downs v. Board of Education of Hoboken,40 which dealt with the
propriety and legality of the transfer, and subsequent dismissal, of
certain teachers to effect economy, and contained allegations of discrimination against married and nonresident female teachers. There
the court stated: "The board appears to us to have acted within the
authority conferred upon it by law, and its action involved the exercise of discretion, and, in the absence of clear abuse, its action ought
"41
not to be disturbed ....
Boult v. Board of Education of Passaic,42 involving a local board's
decision to close a school to effectuate savings, represented one of
the broadest grants of discretionary power to a local board. The court,
in discussing the provisions for review under the school laws, stated:
Neither of the quoted statutory provisions was intended to
vest in the appellate officer or body the authority to exercise
originally the discretionary power vested in the local board. The
review authorized of the local board's action here involved is
judicial in nature ...
* * * The reviewing officer was not empowered to substitute
his discretion for that of the local board. The offer of proof, as
it is described in the Commissioner's opinion, amounted to nothing
more than an offer to establish that the local board's determination
was based upon erroneous factual material. Discretionary municipal action may not be judicially condemned on that basis. 43
The first appreciable beginning of the deviation from the above
standard is found in Laba, where the court recognized that, in reaching his determination, the Commissioner "must, of course, give due
weight to the nature of the findings below, although his primary responsibility is to make certain that the terms and policies of the School
Laws are being faithfully effectuated. '44 Following Laba, In re Masie11o 45 supplied the mechanism for the destruction of the previous
standard. In elaborating upon the above quotation, the court stated:
More definitively, this means that the burden of the Commissioner
is to weigh the evidence and to make an independent finding of
fact on the record presented; and in the process of reaching that
finding, he should give due regard to the opportunity of the hearer
below to observe the witnesses and to evaluate their credibil40 12 N.J. Misc. 345, 171 A. 528 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 113 N.J.L. 401, 174
A. 529 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
41 Id. at 349, 171 A. at 530.
42 136 N.J.L. 521, 57 A.2d 12 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
43 Id. at 523, 57 A.2d at 13-14.
44 23 N.J. at 382, 129 A.2d at 283.
45 25 N.J. 590, 138 A.2d 393 (1958).
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ity.... On the other hand, if, as in this case, the hearing demanded
by principles of fair play is had before him for the first time, then
the obligation to "decide" signifies a completely de novo and
46
independent decision on the facts.
Thereafter, in Kopera v. West Orange Board of Education,47 the appellate division outlined a tripartite division of cases which were reviewable by the Commissioner. The court expressed the view that
in cases involving questions of law, or questions of fact, the Commissioner's duty was that expressed by the court in In re Masiello, but
where the issue was one of discretion, the Commissioner was only to
determine if the lower body had a reasonable basis for its conclu48
sions.
The tripartite division concept did not last long before the court
in Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield49 began its attack on
the discretionary power of the lower bodies. Booker, which involved
de facto segregation in public schools, immensely limited the scope
of the local board's discretionary powers in matters of school integration. The case involved three plans which were proposed to effectuate
the integration of the Plainfield school system. The local board had
chosen what was called the Sixth Grade Plan. The court rejected the
Commissioner's contention that on appeal he must keep within proper
limits of judicial inquiry and not interfere with local management
unless the board violated the law, acted in bad faith, or abused its
discretion. The court instead took the position that when the sufficiency of the local choice is brought before the Commissioner, "he
must affirmatively determine whether the reasonably feasible steps
towards desegregation are being taken in proper fulfillment of State
policy; if not, he may remand the matter to the local board for further
action or may prescribe a plan of his own ...."51
The movement away from adherence to the appellate standard
and toward de novo determination by the Commissioner was greatly
accelerated by the interpretation given the Tenure Employee's Hearing Act in In re Fulcomer. 2 In that case, the court construed the act
to require that the Commissioner, and not the local board of education, render a decision in the first instance in teacher removal and
Id. at 606, 138 A.2d at 401.
60 N.J. Super. 288, 158 A.2d 842 (App. Div. 1960).
48 Id. at 296, 158 A.2d at 846.
49 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).
50 Id. at 177, 212 A.2d at 10.
51 Id. at 178, 212 A.2d at 10.
52 93 N.J. Super. 404, 226 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1967).
46
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disciplinary proceedings.53 The court also reprimanded the Commissioner for referring the matter of imposition of a proper penalty back
to the local officials. 54 Therefore, this case interpreted the Tenure
Employee's Hearing Act as relieving the local board of all jurisdiction
over these proceedings except for holding a simple preliminary hear55
ing.
3The standard which the court applies in reviewing decisions of
the State Department of Education is strikingly dissimilar to that applied by the Commissioner in reviewing decisions of the local bodies.
As expressed by the court in Elizabeth:
The nature of the judicial inquiry in reviewing administrative
determinations is well settled: "whether the findings made could
reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due
regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to
judge their credibility * * *,and, in case of agency review, with
due regard also to the agency's expertise where such expertise is
a pertinent factor." 56
The courts in reviewing discretionary or factual findings of the
State Department of Education have consistently, with only a few
exceptions, 57 accepted the Department's opinion. 58 An example of
the homage rendered is expressed in Thomas v. Board of Education of
Morris Twp.: 59
We are here concerned with a determination made by an
administrative agency duly created and empowered by legislative
fiat. When such a body acts within its authority, its decision is
entitled to a presumption of correctness and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such decision was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. The agency's factual determinations
must be accepted if supported by substantial credible evidence.6 0
Id. at 412, 226 A.2d at 35.
54 Id. at 416-18, 226 A.2d at 37-38.
55 Id. at 413, 226 A.2d at 35.
56 55 N.J. at 507-08, 262 A.2d at 884.
57 See Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); In re Fulcomer,
93 N.J. Super. 404, 226 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1967).
58 See In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 138 A.2d 393 (1958); Rankin v. Board of Educ.,
135 N.J.L. 299, 51 A.2d 194 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Schinck v. Board of Educ., 60 N.J.
Super. 448, 159 A.2d 396 (App. Div. 1960); Kopera v. Board of Educ., 60 N.J. Super.
288, 158 A.2d 842 (App. Div. 1960); Redcay v. State Bd. of Educ., 130 N.J.L. 369, 33
A2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1943), afJ'd, 131 N.J.L. 326, 36 A.2d 428 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
59 89 N.J. Super. 327, 215 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1965).
60 Id. at 332, 215 A.2d at 37.
53
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The instance in which the courts deviate from this standard is where
the issue to be determined is a matter of law. In such a case, the
standard applied is that of judicial review. The determination of
which standard to be applied rests upon an evaluation of the degree
of administrative expertise, policy making, and fact finding involved
in the specific circumstances. In certain instances courts will give the
State Department of Education wide range in the latter's determination of a legal issue, 61 whereas in other circumstances the courts may
62
reverse what may have been a reasonable interpretation.
Elizabeth has not modified nor changed the law in this area.
It has followed the set policy of judicial review of administrative
actions and voluntarily succumbed to the expertise of the administrative determination.
4
To complete the outline of the interrelationships of the different
governmental divisions under the school laws, it is necessary to mention the position and power of the local electorate in this organizational structure in determining school budgets, and the attitude of
the courts toward the electorate.
In East Brunswick, the local electorate had twice rejected the
proposed budget at the polls. Thereafter, in accord with the statutory
requirements, the budget came before the township council who, after consultation with the local board of education, had the duty of
certifying to the county board of taxation an amount which the
council considered necessary to provide for a thorough and efficient
system of schools in the district. The court, commenting on this procedure, stated:
61 See In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 138 A.2d 393 (1958) (court, after stating that the
Commissioner, in his written opinion, did not discuss and distinguish each cited precedent, affirmed the Commissioner's finding without stating the citations or facts of the
precedents relied upon); Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957)
(court affirmed Commissioner's contention that teacher's dismissal is proper if local
officials find that teacher contumaciously or frivolously invoked fifth amendment before
House subcommittee); Canfield v. Board of Educ., 97 N.J. Super. 483, 235 A.2d 470
(App. Div. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 51 N.J. 400, 241 A.2d 233 (1968) (appellate division
agreed with Commissioner that teacher had gained tenure status, even though she
had been discharged before end of requisite statutory period).
62 See Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965) (Commissioner's
determination that it was the responsibility of the local board to determine best integration plan and his finding that so-called Sixth Grade Plan was proper was held to be
error); Seidel v. Board of Educ., 110 N.J.L. 31, 164 A. 901 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, Ill N.J.L.
240, 168 A. 297 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) (Commissioner's interpretation that teacher was
employed under special contract was erroneous).
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Nothing in the letter or spirit of R.S. 18:7-82 precludes the Council
from certifying the same amount as proposed in the Board of
Education's budget; on the contrary, the Council would be obligated to certify that very amount whenever it considers it necessary to satisfy the statutory standard. 63
In Elizabeth the court stated that what was said in East Brunswick
should equally apply:
The governing body may, of course, seek to effect savings
which will not impair the educational process. But its determinations must be independent ones properly related to educational
considerations rather than voter reactions. In every step it must
act conscientiously, reasonably and with full regard for the State's
educational standards and its own obligation to fix a sum sufficient
to provide a system of local schools which may fairly be considered
64
thorough and efficient in view of the makeup of the community.
The result of these two cases was to severely curtail the effect
of voter opinion with regard to the amount of the school budget to be
certified. East Brunswick accomplished this by giving both the municipal governing body and the State Department of Education the
power to overrule the decision of the voters. Elizabeth concurred by
giving the Department of Education, an administrative agency, the
power to overrule an elected body, the township council.
CONCLUSION

By discussing the issues involved in Elizabeth and East Brunswick
separately, their effect upon the law governing education cannot be
fully appreciated. The total composition of all the issues must be
examined cumulatively. In summarizing each of the previous sections,
it can be readily ascertained that the court did four things. First,
it gave the Department of Education the power to overrule the municipal governing body in attacks upon the validity of the sufficiency of
the school budget. Second, it changed the Department's scope of review, extending the Commissioner's power beyond a mere determination of arbitrariness, to a dubious standard somewhere more than
merely determining whether the lower body had a substantial basis
for its decision, but less than the authority to substitute his discretion
for that of the lower body. Third, it adhered to the well established
standard of judicial review of administrative actions. Fourth, it
48 N.J. at 98, 223 A.2d at 483.
55 N.J. at 506, 262 A.2d at 883 (quoting East Brunswick, 48 N.J. at 105-06, 223
A.2d at 487).
63
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gave the municipal governing body and the Department of Education
the right to overrule the electorate.
The court, by giving the Commissioner the power to overrule the
municipal governing body when he felt that the budget did not meet
the constitutional standard, and by applying the administrative review standard on appeal from the Department's decisions, has advanced the movement of centralization of power in the position of
the Commissioner. It has taken another step toward central state
control, and away from local control of the school system. This
broadening of the Department's powers has been accomplished on the
rationale that the Commissioner and the State Board are better qualified to determine these issues because of their expertise and knowledge in school affairs. This raises an important question concerning
the court's logic. Do the Commissioner and State Board possess that
degree of expertise necessary to validate the grant of jurisdiction over
tenure disputes, contractual issues, controversies involving transportation of pupils, election and appointment of school personnel, salary
disputes, local bond issues, discrimination, school integration, statutory interpretation, school construction guidelines and controversies
over teachers pleading the fifth amendment? The argument may be
made that there are sufficient safeguards, in that the Commissioner's
determination is appealable to the State Board for a complete review.
This contention possesses validity, but loses significance in that members of the State Board are not required to have any legal background,
are not salaried, are not full-time, 65 and often completely acquiesce in
the Commissioner's decision. The argument can also be made that
the legal issues on appeal are submitted to a legal committee, comprised of attorneys, for hearing. However, it has been noted that the
State Board as a whole, and not the legal committee, decides. 68
The current law in relation to education is in a state of transformation. The power is shifting from the local community to the
State Department of Education, resulting in the incongruous position
of having voters vote on a school budget, yet allowing them to be
overruled by an appointive body. The obvious question which arises
is: By what authority can voters be overruled by an appointive body if
in a democratic system all authority emanates from the people?
The discordance under the present school laws can be attributed
to the generally quiet and gradual movement away from the tradi65 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:4-3, 6 (1968).
66 See Redcay v. State Bd. of Educ., 128 N.J.L. 281, 25 A.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1942);
Seidel v. Board of Educ., 110 N.J.L. 31, 164 A. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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tional voter controlled local school system. This movement has caused
inconsistencies because of the desire of the various governmental
branches to take the power from the local electorate without a tumultuous voter outcry which a swift and overt transformation might
bring about. To eliminate the inconsistencies there are basically
three paths which the law can take. First, the legislature could completely centralize all public schools and have them totally supported
by state revenue. Second, the control of the schools could be returned
to the electorate and their local representative officials with minimal
state interference. Third, the participation of the local electorate and
municipal governing bodies in school affairs could be totally elimi67
nated.
The main issue involved in Elizabeth and East Brunswick is the
issue of power. Should the Commissioner be given such a wide range
of power? Should he virtually be able to control the entire public
school system of the state, by promulgating rules and regulations, interpreting them, and reviewing the decisions of the local bodies? Should
he be able to overrule the local bodies under the vague standard of
East Brunswick and Elizabeth?
All these questions point to the issue of a centralized state public school system as opposed to a system governed by the local school
districts. The current trend toward centralization is not being promulgated by the legislature but by the courts. The advantages and disadvantages of a centralized school system are not being discussed. The
experiences of other states under both types of systems are not mentioned. Yet, centralization is occurring in a piecemeal fashion through
interpretation of statutes which have traditionally supported a local
school system, but are now being construed to mandate a centralized
system. Should it be the duty of the courts, the legislature, or the
people, to determine the type of system which is to govern our public
schools?
Michael A. Santaniello
67 There is legislation currently pending in the senate, introduced by Senator
Hiering on February 2, 1970, affecting this area of law. This bill, S. 525, would completely eliminate any participation of the voters and the municipal governing body
in certification of school budgets. In a type II district the school budgets would be
placed completely in the hands of the local board of education, whose members would
have the duty of certifying the yearly budget to the county board of taxation.

